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An Analytical Model to Assure Consideration of
Parental and Familial Interests when Defining
the Constitutional Rights of Minors-An
Examination of In Re Scott K.
On May 25,1979, the California Supreme Court determined
that parental permission given to police officers to make a warrantless search of a resident minor son's tool box impermissibly
infringed the minor's right of privacy.' The United States Supreme Court's denial of the State's petition for certiorari in Fare
u. Scott K.' finalized the California Supreme Court's judgment.
Two United States Supreme Court opinions handed down since
Scott K. implicitly support the prosecution's position advocating
the primacy of parental rights in the home? This Comment will
examine the conflicting parent-child rights in Scott K. in light of
these two recent Supreme Court opinions. An alternative theory
for the reconcilement of conflicting individual constitutional
rights within the family will be examined with Scott K. serving
as a model in which to consider the proposed method of judicial
analysis.
11. THEScott DECISION

A. The Facts
The facts in Scott K., although unique, are fairly simple.
The minor son lived a t home with his natural parents but did
1. Fare v. Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 973 (1979).
2. 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
3. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
Parham upheld the right of parents to voluntarily commit their children to state-operated mental institutions. In Bellotti, Justice Powell's plurality opinion outlined parental
rights in a nonabortion context to "provide some guidance as to how a State constitutionally may provide for adult involvementeither by parents or a state official such as a
judge-in the abortion decisions of minors." 443 U.S. at 652 n.32. However, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, characterized Powell's opinion as "advisory" because it attempted to resolve "hypothetical" questions. Id. at 651
n.32, 656 n.4 (concurring opinion). Although Powell's opinion was criticized for addressing hypothetical questions, it was not criticized as an inaccurate analysis of constitutional law regarding parent-child relationships.
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not contribute in any definite way to the maintenance of the
family home. The mother discovered marijuana in the minor's
bedroom desk drawer. She gave the contraband to a neighbor,
an off-duty policeman, and indicated her belief that the boy was
trafficking in the drug.' One week later, another officer came to
the home to arrest the boy for possession of marijuana with intent to sell? The father invited the officer to come inside the
home after the son, who had been working in the garage, was
arrested.' The father later gave permission to the officer to
search the home for additional contraband, and the officer discovered a locked toolbox in the boy's room? Despite the son's
sole ownership of the toolbox and his obvious displeasure, the
officer, still acting with the father's permission, opened the toolbox? The marijuana hidden within the box was instrumental in
convicting the minor. The conviction, affirmed by the appellate
court: was overturned by the California Supreme Court because
the officer had violated the minor's right under the California
Constitution to be free from unreasonable, warrantless searches
and seizures.1°
4. Transcript of the L.A. Super. Ct. No. 5811554, at 11, In re Scott K., 75 Cal. App.
3d 162, 142 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Transcript).
5. Id. The minor was charged with violation of the California Health and Safety
Code: "Every person who possesses for sale any marijuana, except as otherwise provided
by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison . . . ." CAL.HEALTH&
SAFETY
CODE8 11359 (West 1976). The statutory provisions of CAL.WELF.& INST.CODE
5 602 (West 1971) were applied to determine whether the minor was a juvenile. See
Transcript, supra note 4, at 33; 24 Cal. 3d at 398,595 P.2d at 106, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
6. Transcript, supra note 4, at 13-14. The trial judge invalidated the arrest under
the test requiring an arrest warrant absent exigent circumstances as enunciated in People v. Ramey, 161 Cal. 3d 262, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
7. The officer testified concerning the father's grant of permission:
[Tlhe father at this time stated for the benefit of the minor and us, telling us
that he was giving us permission to search his [the minor's] room now and
anytime in the future we felt like it, and I think he did not make it even a
restriction on the boy's room only. He told the boy that-or us that we could
search his whole residence anytime we felt like it.
Transcript, supra note 4, at 14.
8. Transcript, supra note 4, at 8-9; 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 673.
9. In re Scott K., 75 Cal. App. 3d 162, 142 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1977), vacated, 24 Cal. 3d
395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979) (the opinion has
been deleted from 75 Cal. App. 3d and hereinafter 75 Cal. App. 3d will not be cited).
10. The court felt the minor was "old enough to assert his rights" under article I,
section 13 of the California Constitution which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant
may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, par-
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B. Development of the Issues
The trial court made a finding of fact that justified the father's actions based on a theory of parent, citizen, and homeowner responsibilities.
I find the officer to have been lawfully within the home. I find
that in this specific case there is a joint effort on the part of
two citizens using the aid and assistance of law enforcement. I
find that the father of the minor, because of the evidence elicited as relates the relationship iis-a-vis the father, the minor
and the home, had the right to conduct a search through
whatever means were efficacious of the entirety of his own
home and anything therein contained, whether placed there by
his son or any other person; that it is not an overextension of
the father's rights to use the instrumentality of the Narcotics
Division of the Los Angeles Police Department to assist him in
doing so."

The trial court further found that parents not only have the
right, but the duty, to "control the activities of their minor children."12 Since the duty of control still existed in the instant
case, the court concluded that the father had a right to consent
to the search for contraband.
The state appellate court framed the issue in a similar manner. "The question before us is whether the constitutional right
of a minor to privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, 5 I), operates to give
him a similar right to privacy as against his parents."lS The
court agreed with the trial judge that the parental interests compelled a conclusion that the search was constitutional.
The California Supreme Court, however, refused to follow
the lower courts' formulation of the issues which focused on the
parent-child relationship. In reversing the two lower courts, the
state supreme court stated: "A minor's interest in both [relations with parents and government] is identifiable even when, as
here, his or her assertion of privacy rights against the government appears to conflict with parental authority. The primary
issue in this case involves the minor's rights regarding his govtitularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be
seized.
24 Ca..3d at 403, 595 P.2d at 109, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
11. Transcript, supra note 4, at 32-33.
12. Id.
13. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
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ernment."14 In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the prosecution attempted to rephrase the issue to refocus the Court's attention on the parent-child
interests.
Does a parent have legal authority to consent to a police search
of his minor child's personal property where said personal
property is located in the parent's home, the minor child resides in the parent's home and is supported by the parent, and
the parent has reasonable grounds to believe the minor child is
engaged in criminal activity in the family home?16

The Supreme Court did not grant certioraril6 so it remains unclear whether the Court would have sided with the California
Supreme Court or the two lower courts.17
An examination of the three California opinions ruling on
Scott K. indicates that the major difference in legal reasoning
stems from the state supreme court's reliance on Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth.18The state supreme court
in Scott K. reasoned that since a parental veto of a minor's decision to secure an abortion had been held unconstitutional in
Danforth,la the parental interests in Scott K. were not compelling. However, two United States Supreme Court decisions since
Scott K. indicate that the fundamental constitutional rights of
parents may not be so easily dismissed.
14. 24 Cal. 3d at 399-400, 595 P.2d at 107-08, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74.
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Fare v. Scott K., 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
16. 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
17. A denial of certiorari does not resolve the arguments on either side.
18. 428 U.S. 52 (1975). See 24 Cal. 3d at 403,595 P.2d at 110,155 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
19. 428 U.S. at 74-75. However, the analysis of the parental interests in Scott K. and
Danforth was fundamentally different. In Scott K., the father's interest in the toolbox
was not examined closely by the majority. 24 Cal. 3d at 405, 595 P.2d at 111, 155 Cal.
Rptr. at 677. In Danforth, on the other hand, the Court analyzed the parent's and family
unit's rights:
It is dilficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power
to overrule a determination, made by the physician with his minor patient, to
terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit.
Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or
control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in
conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure.
428 U.S. at 75. Although the Court in Danforth found more compelling interests in the
physician-child relationship than in the parent-child relationship, the Court at least analyzed the effect its decision would have on parents and families in the abortion context.
In drawing upon Danforth as precedent, the California Supreme Court should a .have
discussed how its holding would affect familial relations.
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After the California courts decided Scott K., the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of the competing
constitutional rights of parents and their minor children in the
cases of Parham v. J.R?O and Bellotti v. Baird? Parham challenged a parent's right to voluntarily commit a minor child to a
state mental institution without a separate hearing to determine
the child's interests." The majority held that parents have such
a right and discussed at length the traditional and accepted role
of parents in our society.
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course; our constitutional system long ago rejected
any notion that a child is "the mere creature of the State" and,
on the contrary, asserted that parents generally "have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
[their children] for additional obligations." Pierce u. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925). . . . The law's concept of the
family rests on a presumption that the parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment
required in making life's difficult decision^.^^

In addition, the Court in Parham upheld the primary importance of parental direction in family relationships.
In defining the respective rights and prerogatives of the
child and parent in the voluntary commitment setting, we conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a sub20. 442 U.S.584 (1979).
21. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
22. 442 U.S. at 600-06. The challenge was unsuccessful. The Court explained that
[plarents in Georgia in no sense have an absolute right to commit their children to state mental hospitals; the statute requires the superintendent of each
regional hospital to exercise independent judgment as to the child's need for
confinement. . . .
[However,] [tlhe parens patriae interest in helping parents care for the
mental health of their children cannot be fulfilled if the parents are unwilling
to take advantage of the opportunities because the admission process is too
onerous, too embarrassing, or too contentious. It is surely not idle to speculate
as to how many parents who believe they are acting in good faith would forgo
state-provided hospital care if such care is contingent on participation in an
adversary proceeding designed to probe their motives and other private family
matters in seeking the voluntary admission.
Id. at 604-05.
23. Id. at 602 (citations omitted) (brackets original).
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stantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a
finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child
should apply.a4

Clearly, then, the Court recognized and upheld the right of parents to control and direct the lives of their children so long as
there is not evidence of abuse or neglect?
In the later case of Bellotti v. Baird, the Court struck down
a Massachusetts attempt to include parents in their child's aborIn so holding, however, the Court affirmed basic
tion decisi~n.'~
parental rights and duties in nonabortion areas?' The Court
found significant precedent in history and tradition justifying
the primacy of parental authorityU and enumerated what it as24. Id. at 604. Even though the Court found that some kind of inquiry should be
made by a "neutral factfinder" to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission were satisfied, the procedure outlined did not "unduly [tread] on traditional parental authority [nor] . . . inhibit parental decisions to seek state help." Id. at 606-07.
25. While there was evidence of possible neglect or abuse in Parham, id. at 589-90,
the Court made no such finding. Had it done so, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), indicates that parental rights could have been limited because the "parental decisions [would] jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Id. at 234.
26. The significant portion of the statute struck down required the following:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the
consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the
mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a
judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearings as he
deems necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.
MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.,ch. 112, $ 12s (West Supp. 1980-1981).
27. It is important to always keep foremost in the analysis of children's rights vis-avis their parents that the abortion decision is unique. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 642.
Therefore, the precedents established in the abortion context are not always applicable
to other decisions minors may wish to make. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602-04.
28. The precedent of history and tradition can be of major importance in the posturing of a case before the C~urt."If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it
. . . ." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,678 (1970) (citing Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)). Justice Stewart observed in Parham that "[flor centuries it
has been a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor children." 442
U.S. at 621. In Bellotti, Justice Powell found that beliefs regarding parental primacy in
the familial relationship are "deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition." 443
U.S. at 638. It would appear that since the parent-child relationship had existed long
before our nation was formed, the role of parents in the home deserves a strong presumption in its favor.
However, it is somewhat ironic that other interpreations of "history" by the Court
fail to take these self-evident facta into account. The historical basis of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), which became persuasive precedent in Planned Parenthood of Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75, failed to take into account the parent-child history that was
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sumed parents teach their children. The Court thought it necessary to prohibit state interference with parental attempts to fulfill that teaching role. After observing the conflicts among childraising theories, Justice Powell placed the exercise of parental
rights in a historical and sociological perspective.
While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this subject,
we cannot ignore that central to many of these theories, and
deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief
that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation
has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society."a@

While reaffirming the parental duty to raise children, the Court
reemphasized earlier declarations defining the duties of parents.

.

The duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations" . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs and elements of good citizenship." Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). This aflirmative process of
teaching, guiding and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.80

The state's role in assisting parents to fulfill these duties was
also clearly articulated. "[Ilt is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations which the state can neither supply nor hinder.'"'
A recognition of these parental rights had formed the basis
of the trial and appellate courts' rationale in Scott K., which upheld parental power to consent to a search of a minor son's
property. Appellate Judge Kingsly found that:
A parent who, as in this case, has reasonable grounds to believe
that a minor child is engaged in serious criminal activity, must
articulated in Parham and Bellotti. Compare 428 U.S. at 75 with 442 U.S. at 602 and
443 U.S. at 637-39. Obviously, this inconsistency is not explainable by events which transpired between 1975 and 1979. Perhaps, then, the use of "history" to determine unwritten constitutional rights depends more on the judicial-historian than on what actually
occurred.
29. 443 U.S. at 637-38 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
30. 443 U.S. at 637-38.
31. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (emphasis
in original).
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be allowed to investigate that belief, in order to determine the
proper discipline and corrective action to be taken. If that investigation involves the search, with or without the minor's
consent, of locked items, the search is justified as a conduct in
aid of the parental power of care and di~cipline.~~

The police action of opening the box and acting as agents for the
father does not change the nature of the parental right:
It follows that, if the father in this case had himself opened the
toolbox, or if the father, exerting his parental authority, had
secured the key from the minor and then opened the box, the
search would have been lawful. . . . What the father could do
himself, he could do by an agent, whether that agent be a locksmith or a policeman.8S

Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court rejected the "notion
that the father here could effectively waive his son's right to be
secure in the son's effects" insofar as that right related to the
state." The state's highest court determined the legality of the
father's third-party consent by examining his interest in his
son's toolbox rather than by analyzing the parent-child relationship. The court stated:
Parents may have a protective interest in property belonging to
children, but that fact may not be assumed. When a warrantless search is challenged the People must show it was reasonable. Here the People did not establish that the consenting parent had a sufficient interest under search and seizure law. The
father claimed no interest in the box or its contents. He acknowledged that the son was owner, and the son did not consent to the search?

By focusing solely upon the possessory interest in a toolbox and
the son's relationship to the state, the court misinterpreted the
significant roles that familial autonomy and parental primacy
~ ~ a narrow
play in our federal constitutional f r a m e w ~ r k .Such
32. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
33. Id.
34. 24 Cal. 3d at 403, 595 P.2d at 110, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
35. Id. at 405, 595 P.2d at 111, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
36. B y avoiding in its judicial analysis the legal presumptions favoring the family
the California Supreme Court committed a significant analytical error. Perhaps it did so
because the record "disc10~8[d]some discord in the parent-child relation." 24 Cal. 3d at
403, 595 P.2d at 109, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675. This conclusion, however, was not documented by specific reference to the trial transcript. B y failing to cite what in fact constituted the familial discord, the court did not articulate what facts or premises would rebut the legal presumption that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the beet
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analysis illustrates an all too frequent oversight in judicial analysis-failure to consider and articulate what effect a determination favoring an individual's constitutional rights may have on
the family.37
The difficulty caused by the type of narrow analysis employed by the California Supreme Court is not that it destroys
the existence of federal parental rights outside the abortion context; rather, it prevents jurists from recognizing the existence of
constitutionally protected parental rights when a conflict arises
between those rights and the rights of their children in relation
to the state?
Two possible reasons may explain why a majority of the
California Supreme Court did not focus on the fundamental nature of parental rights. First, some members of the court may be
opposed to "a strong public policy protecting the interest of a
parent in the care, discipline and control of a minor child."s@
Such an attitude necessarily detracts from the primacy of federally recognized parental rights when parental rights are balanced
interests of their children. Moreover, the court's election not to specify when and how
presumptions are rebutted that favor "protecting the interests of a parent in the care,
discipline and control of a minor child," 75 Cal. App. 3d at 164, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 63,
deprived lower or sister state courts, desiring to resolve parent-child constitutional conflicts, of needed guidance. Indeed, the conclusion in Scott K. that the minor "was age 17,
old enough to assert his rights," 24 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 595 P.2d at 109, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
675, seems to overlook Justice Powell's conclusion that "the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his or her need and opportunity
for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended." 443 U.S. at 644 n.23.
The well-recognized fact that "parents naturally take an interest in the welfare of their
children-an interest that is particularly strong where a normal family relationship exists and where the child is living with one or both parents," id. at 648, was not addressed
by the California court as an important factor to be considered when determining a minor's constitutional rights vis-a-vis his parents and the state.
37. This oversight obviously occurred in Scott K. For other Supreme Court cases
that have resolved individual rights in ways that significantly impact the family unit, see
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Zoblacki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
38. There is ample precedent granting parental rights constitutional protection. See
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 639 n.18, (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977)); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 US. 678, 708 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602-05 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 170 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925).
39. I n re Scott K., 142 Cal. Rptr. a t 63.
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with those of the minor child.'O Secondly, the Supreme Court
precedent in Roe u. Wade4' and Planned Parenthood of Missouri u. Danf~rth,'~
which favors consideration of the constitutional rights of individual family members without a complete
analysis of familial rights, provides no model for courts to follow
in considering competing constitutional rights.
With this background information in mind, this Comment
will introduce and illustrate a model for judicial analysis of these
conflicting rights. While the model does not intrinsically favor
the rights of either parent or child, it ensures that the rights of
all family members will be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process. The use of this model as a framework for opinion writing or fact resolution will ensure that the federally recognized role of parental primacy in the home is not overlooked or
intentionally sidestepped in court decisions allegedly focusing on
children's constitutional rights."

IV. JUDICIAL
REVIEW
OF CONFLICTING
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
OF PARENT
AND CHILDBY ANALOGY
A. Creation of "Judicial Legislation"
The Scott K. case was appealed, inter alia, under the fourteenth amendment.44 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has
tested legislation under a two-tiered equal protection analysis.4s
40. Justice Richardson's dissent advocated the balancing approach. See 24 Cal. 3d
at 408-09, 595 P.2d at 113, 155 Cal. Rptr. a t 678-79.
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court specifically reserved judgment in Roe on family
issues in the abortion area, id. at 165 n.7, however, the Roe holding served in part as
authority for the Danforth holding, especially as it related to the privacy rights of the
pregnant woman, see 428 U.S. at 69-72.
42. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
43. The California Supreme Court is not alone among state courts that have sidestepped analysis of difficult parental rights issues under the pretext of solely examining a
minor's rights vis-a-vis the state. See Rouw v. Arkansas, 265 Ark. 797, 581 S.W.2d 313
(1979); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432,224 A.2d 588 (1966); Commonwealth v. Smith, 472
Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari a t 3, Fare v. Scott K., 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
45. This Comment does not examine the positions taken by commentators who define the Court's equal protection analysis in levels of scrutiny greater than rational basis.
See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.L. REV.1 (1972).
The "sliding scale" approach to equal protection analysis, first enunciated by Justice
Marshall in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), is similarly not discussed here.
For an exfellent discussion on this approach and how it is applied to determine the
"fundamentalness" of rights, see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98124 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

608

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

Provided the legislation is rationally related to the achievement
of goals within the scope of a legislative body's constitutional
power, it will be upheld unless it (1) improperly affects a "suspect" classifi~ation~~
or (2) infringes the exercise of a fundamental right." This two-tiered test can also be applied by analogy to
situations involving individual and family rights. Before making
its final decision, a court could examine the possible ramifications of its holding by treating its tentative opinion as a statute
and then applying equal protection analysis. Obviously, judicial
opinions are not legislation, but the public policy set by judicial
precedent often has the same political and practical impact
upon society. For this reason, the self-imposed application of
equal protection analysis to prospective judicial opinions is
appropriate.
For example, if the Scott K. case had been enacted by a
legislature, instead of announced by a court, the law might have
read like this:
Because of a desire to ensure that a minor's constitutional
right to privacy is recognized in this state, a minor has an abso46. The concept of "suspect" classifications was first articulated by Justice Jackson
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) as follows:
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
Id. at 216. Although Koremtsu found "public necessity" to exist, id. at 223-24, subsequent cases struck down legislative classifications based on race. See University of Cal.
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (graduate school applicants improperly given racial preference); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967) (invalidating criminal sanctions for
interracial marriage); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), (prohibiting racial
segregation in public schools). Other classifications receiving varying degrees of judicial
scrutiny include gender, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); alienage, Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); illegitimacy, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
and national origin, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
47. Exercise of a fundamental right cannot be limited by an absolute ban, such as
prior restraint of the press, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); prohibition of interracial marriages, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967); or denial of the right to procreate,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Other impermissible limitations include impeding one's right to marry by requiring payments of Court ordered support payments,
Zoblacki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), or the denial of welfare benefits to persons who
choose to exercise their right of travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
For articulation of various criteria d e w and establishing fundamental rights, see
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) and Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). For a discussion of fundamental rights not enumerated
in the Constitution, see Griawold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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lute right to be free from a warrantless search that is consented
to by his parents, even though both the parents and police are
aware of reasonable evidence indicating the juvenile is engaging in criminal activity in the home. This law is to be applied
by the judiciary in such a manner that the parental interest in
raising and training children is not the primary issue when a
court is determining the constitutionality of parent-approved
warrantless police searches of children's property.

Once the prospective holding has been recast in legislative form,
the judge writing the opinion should then subject the holding of
an early draft to an analogous "strict judicial scrutiny."48 Failure
to meet any of the criteria traditionally recognized in equal protection analysis would require either a revision of the opinion or
at least a clearly articulated explanation as to why the fundamental rights of other family members are not considered
om pel ling.^^

B. Application of Equal Protection Analysis to the Scott K .
"Judicial Legislation"
1. Are the chosen "means" rationally related to the desired

"ends" of the judicial "legislation"?
The means chosen to achieve the objective of the Scott K.
holding are not rationally related because they are overinclusive:
they encompass a larger area than necessary. In its effort to protect the child from parent-approved governmental searches, the
court failed to distinguish between two basic types of individual
freedoms that exist in a democratic society: the freedom to be
free from something, generally, unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's personal life; and the freedom to be free for
something, such as the freedom to chose to prepare oneself to
contribute to society.
48. The strict judicial scrutiny standard was first articulated in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The problem caused by strict scrutiny is that it is
applied with varying degrees of strictness. For example, the Court decided that "discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not 'command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,' San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973), which our most exacting scrutiny would entail."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976). The application of "strict" and "not so
strict" judicial scrutiny in the illegitimacy field illustrates that this type of analysis can
be applied somewhat unevenly by the same judges.
49. In. addition to fundamental rights of parents, fundamental rights of federalism,
which reserve to the states "[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution," are also offended. See U.S. CONST.amend. X.
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By emphasizing the child's right to be free from something-warrantless police searches-the
California Supreme
Court has impermissibly infringed the parents' duty and right to
be free to prepare the child for societal respon~ibilities.~~
In contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized a parental duty requiring an "aflirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring,
by precept and example [which] is essential to the growth of
young people into mature, socially responsible citizen^."^^ Indeed, the Court has noted that "[llegal restrictions on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and re~arding."~'By denying parents the right to act in a way beneficial to their children and family, the California Supreme Court
appears to have impermissibly infringed the parent's ability to
fulfill these obligations.
2. Is the classification of children as a separate
constitutional?

Children have long been recognized as being
ents of special treatment in state legislation." For example, the
well known case of Ginsberg v. New York," which held that the
state has the right to prohibit the sale of pornography to minors
under age seventeen, reinforces this policy." In Ginsberg the
Court observed that "the legislature could properly conclude
50. If a child is not taught industry and self-reliance, and is not encouraged to develop these traits during his early life, the child may lack the ability to make a signscant, constructive contribution to society. Since an emancipated minor usually lacks such
skills, without parental training and encouragement it may be difficult for him to contribute in a meaningful way to society. Although the minor may be "free" to contribute,
his lack of adequate preparation may prevent him from doing so.
51. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 638. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,233
(1972).
52. Id. at 638-39.
53. "Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically
transferred to determination of a State's duty towards children." Id. at 633-34 (quoting
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Justice Powell
also noted three reasons why the constitutional rights of children are not congruent with
those of adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed mature manner, and the importance of the parental role in
child-rearing." Id. at 634.
54. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
55. Public airways have also been restricted for the benefit of unsuspecting children.
F.C.C. v. Pacsca Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-750 (1978).
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that parents . . who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to
The Court cited a
aid the discharge of that resp~nsibility."~
commentator approving the legislation of "morality" when it enhanced the ability of the parents to inculcate morals in the child
as the parent saw fit."
In the nonabortion area, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently reaffirmed laws supporting parental attempts to
exercise control over their children without giving the children
any rights or prerogatives held by their parents.58 Such precedent indicates that the focus in Scott K. on the child-state relationship rather than on the parent-child relationship could have
been held unconstitutional had the same delineation been made
by a state legislature.
3. Does the statute impermissibly infringe essential rights of

the family unit, parents, or children?
a. Rights of the family unit are infringed. The proposed
Scott K. "statute" appears to infringe fundamental rights of the
family. Regarding due process rights affecting the family, the
Supreme Court has noted:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
offended, "[ilf a State were to attempt to force the breakup of
a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole
reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest."5s

Placing aside the requirement that the children actually protest
the breaking up of the familyPOthe Scott K. "statute" offends
56. 390 U.S. at 639.
57. Id. at 639-40 n.7 (citing Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM.
L. REV.391, 413 n.68 (1963)). Justice Powell similarly found compelling interests in protecting the parental right to distribute contraceptives to their children. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
58. See cases cited note 38 supra.
59. Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Justice Marshall's
opinion in Quillon was for a unanimous Court.
60. Since parents traditionally speak in behalf of their children, Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. at 584 (Stewart, J., concurring), the protests of the parents regarding the dissolution
of the natural family would be considered as the protests of both the parent and child.
Therefore, an analysis of the concerns of the protesting parents would in fact meet the
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due process because it elevates the legal position of the minor to
be at least coequal with that of the parent? Such equality destroys the legal presumptions upon which the family is based
and could cause the "breaking up [of] the natural family.'"'
While family members may still live in the same residence, the
legal and practical expectations in the relationship would be seriously altered when the general populace, especially rebellious
minors, understood the implications of a decision like Scott K.
Since Supreme Court opinions indicate the family unit has a legitimate expectation of protection in the law:8 there should be a
hearing of some kind regarding the potential dissolution of the
family. Due process requires nothing less."
b. Fundamental parental rights are infringed. Enactment
of the Scott K. "statute" impermissibly infringes parents' responsibilities to their other children and their interests as homeowner~.~'
Aside from the parental responsibility discussed by the
appellate court in Scott K. to prepare an erring son for additional obligations in life:6 other interests are equally important.
requirements and standards enunciated in Quillon.
61. The majority opinion in Scott K. completely ignored the additional parental interests in (1) a stable home environment, free from criminal activity and (2) protecting
the interest of other children in the home-a concern articulated by Justice Richardson's
dissent. See text accompanying note 69 infra. Thus, it can be argued that the child's
individual rights were elevated above those of the parent because parental rights in areas
not related to the son's right to autonomy were infringed by the decision.
62. The attempt to equalize the parent-child relationship destroys the legal presumptions that favor parental primacy in the home. Such equalization also presupposes
that a parent cannot correctly guide the child and add to his life for the long-term benefit of both parties.
63. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510, 535 (1925).
64. Where there is an expectation of a right or interest, a hearing must be held to
determine the reasons justifying the taking away of that right. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
65. If the court is determined to focus solely on the individual child's interests vis-avis the state, then its determination should affect only the fundamental relationship of
the parent with that one child. It should not interfere with or affect (1) other familial or
personal areas of the parent's life or (2) the relationship of any other sibling with that
particular parent. For example, in addition to an interest in disciplining one child, the
parent has a fundamental right to maintain a home that is free from criminal activity, as
well as to provide a safe environment and proper guidance for other children in the
home. The conclusion that these rights should not be examined or recognized because
the other family members are not parties in the litigation, see Lowe, In re Scott K.;
Equality under the Law? A Minor's Dilemma, 6 W. ST. U.L.R. 157, 163-68 (1978), presupposes that the exercise of constitutional rights of individual family members takes
place in a vacuum. This is simply not true.
66. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
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Justice Richardson, dissenting from the California Supreme
Court's holding in Scott K., found these alternative parental responsibilities compelling:
The parents had a legitimate purpose in seeking to ferret out
the existence of any criminal activity conducted in any part of
their home. Their responsibility to themselves, and as parents
of Scott and of any other children in the family required that
they do so. Parents in certain situations have a right to be suspicious, and to act reasonably in accordance with those suspicions. They do not help their children if they do otherwise. A
locked container controlled solely by the suspect minor and
found in his room would, of course, be one of the most logical
places for concealment of contraband or criminal evidence.
Under the foregoing conditions, I would not recognize a
child's right of "sanctuary" vis-a-vis the responsible parent.67

The United States Supreme Court's recent rearmation of the
parental responsibility to train and prepare their children would
probably mandate that the Scott K. "statute" be struck down on
this point alone, for it impermissibly infringes fundamental
rights of parents regarding their other children.
c. Children's rights and expectations under the law are
infringed. The judicial-statute in Scott K. impermissibly infringes the child's long-term, fundamental rightsm in two ways.
First, a child has the right to be raised by his parents:@ even
though he may rebel against parental decisions. To deprive a mi67. 24 Cal. 3d at 409,595 P.2d a t 113, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
68. While not articulated in current standards, perhaps the fundamental rights of a
child could be characterized in a long-term framework rather than a present-enjoyment
analysis. Since minors, by definition, do not have equal legal status with adults, perhaps
the criteria for determining the fundamentalnesa of a minor's rights should focus on how
the immediate exercise or denial of a right will affect the minor's exercise of that right
after attaining majority. For ekample, in determining that a child has a fundamental
right of privacy in the home vis-a-vis his parents, the court should consider not only the
immediate strains this will place on the parent-child relationship but also whether it will
deprive the minor of an opportunity to learn proper parental roles essential to exercise
his future, fundamental right to raise and discipline his own children. By allowing a
minor to flout parental authority while breaking the law because of the alleged error of a
law enforcement officer (who reasonably relied on the parental consent to search), the
court infringed the minor's rights in two additional ways. The minor's right and duty to
prepare to make a social contribution as a law abiding citizen is infringed, see Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 US. 205,233 (1972), as ia his right to enjoy a positive and natural relationship with his parents and other family members in the future. Such long-term results
question the real fundamentalnesa of short-term "rights" which the court attempted to
"give" to the minor in Scott K.
69. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.at 638-39.
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nor of parental correction and discipline by practically forbidding law enforcement involvement with parents who are aware
their child is knowingly breaking the law takes away the child's
right to parental direction and guidance. Secondly, both constitutional and family law is premised on the expectation that parents can and will assist their children in making difficult
decisions.
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children?O
To claim Scott's actions demonstrated that he had proper judgment is to equate either lawbreaking or avoiding criminal punishment with maturity.
The child then, as well as the parents and family unit, had
fundamental rights infringed by the "enactment" of the Scott K.
decision. Since an equal protection analysis of the Scott K.
"bill" indicates that it would have been unconstitutional if enacted by a legislature, the California Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court should have examined more
closely the compelling issues in the case.71 To avoid infringing
the well-recognized rights of parents regarding their minor children, judges should place the early draft of future decisions in a
legislative mold to ascertain whether it can withstand a self-imposed strict judicial scrutiny. Such measures would lead to analytical resolutions of conflicts between a child's constitutional
rights and the rights of his parents." Such an analysis should
occur whether or not the parent is a party in the case.7s
70. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602.

71. While the Supreme Court did review the state's request for certiorari in Scott
K., a more careful examination of the issues it posed or a more structured analysis of
parental rights in the abortion context might have eliminated much of the rationale used
by the California Supreme Court to justify its decision. Of course a denial of certiorari is
neither an affirmance or reversal of the California Supreme Court.
72. Poorly reasoned decisions are those which attempt to brush-off or ignore major,
precedentially sound viewpoints that appear in the lower court opinions and the briefs
filed on appellate review. To disagree with the lower court holdings is not improper;
however, it hinders the principled development of the law for a court to disagree and
then fail to articulate the standards used to arrive at that disagreement.
73. Parental rights are obviously at stake in cases similar to Scott K. For example,
in Bellotti the parents had enough interest in the case, even though not parties, to motivate Justice Powell to address a significant portion of the Court's opinion to the relation-
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The difficulty caused when courts abandon recognition of
parental rights in cases dealing with conflicting parent-childstate interests could be resolved if the judge drafting the opinion
would analyze the conflicts in the analytical framework proposed
in this Comment. After recognizing that the fundamental rights
of all family members will probably be affected by a ruling on
the rights of one member, the opinion writer could place the tentative holding in a legislative mold to more easily subject the
opinion to a traditional equal protection analysis. It would be
examined for (i)a rational and specific relationship between the
ends and the means selected; (2) an impermissible classification
of subject matter; and (3) possible infringements of the fundamental rights of the family unit, parents, or children. If the selfimposed "strict judicial scrutiny" uncovers constitutional weaknesses in the initial decision, the judge should rewrite the opinion to eliminate conflicts or to articulate the reasons why the
constitutional rights of others were not considered significant.
The self-restraint imposed by this type of analysis would improve the underlying rationale of opinions, even if the analysis is
not articulated. While application of this model may not always
result in judicial opinions favoring parental rights, it will ensure
that the preeminence of parents in American society will be fully
considered and recognized in judicial opinion writing.

Matthew Fenn Hilton

ship of parent-child rights. See 443 U.S. at 633-39. Other cases which have established
parental rights did not have parents as actual litigants. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

